RESEARCH ARTICLE

# NEUTROSOPHIC SOCIO-DISCOURSIVENESS: FROM CEREMONIAL TO INCERTITUDE

Georgiana Camelia Stănescu, University of Craiova, georgiana.stanescu@edu.ucv.ro

**Abstract**

This study represents an implementation of neutrosophy in the field of verbal communication (discourse). The methods used include meta-analytical, comparative, and inductive techniques. Concerning the neutrosophic criterion (F. Smarandache), as well as the way of thinking (Vattimo G & Rovatti P-A, 1998), we can distinguish two types of discourse: the ceremonial and the impositive discourse. In Gianni Vattimo's opinion (1998), there are two types of thinking: weak and strong thinking (weak and strong thought). The ceremonial discourse is based on weak thinking, and it has a high neutrosophic coefficient. The impositive discourse lies on strong thought and contains a low neutrosophic coefficient; this type embodies two forms: argumentation (the reasoning) and the demonstration. Starting from different directions, both types of discourse come close to validating knowledge, more precisely to what is true and what is false. This study puts forward the fact that the evidence, the demonstration, and the argumentation stand for discoursive aids that can consolidate a space of the critical opinion and of the neutrosophic Incertitude or a space of silence, according to the degree of eligibility and imposition.

Keywords: neutrosophy, discourse, ceremonial discourse, impositive discourse, argumentation, demonstration

## 1 Introduction

Our thesis lies in the fact that neither argumentation nor demonstration are methods of investigation but ways of imposition. Used within the field of knowledge and thinking, they do not act in the context of discovery but in the context of justification (explanation). Their role is to emphasize, legitimize, authorize, justify, and motivate. O. Ducrot and J.-C. Anscombre capture incidentally and disjunctively, in the definition of argumentation, the constitutive idea of imposition: "When we talk about argumentation, we always refer to those discourses that contain at least two utterances E1 and E2, out of which one is used in order to authorize, justify or *impose*" (Anscombre J.-C., Ducrot O. 1983). Professor Daniela Rovenţa-Frumuşani sustains that "The argumentative discourse is *oriented* (s.n.) towards the receiver, as it aims at the modification of the internal dispositions of the addressee" (Rovenţa-Frumuşani D. 2004). Imposition is the toughest type of orientation, whereas orientation is the most delicate form of imposition. Generally speaking, argumentation appears for the discourse as dispensable. The ceremonial-formal proposition is not and must not be accompanied by a legitimizing effort. The exigency manifested by the impositive discourse (argumentative-demonstrative), where justification is indispensable and has an essential role, is to be found in striking contrast with this condition of the ceremonial demarche. The aim and the result of this demarche command the legitimizing effort. The value of the constructive proposition does not depend on the validity of the proof that sustains it. However, the value of the result of such a demarche – the authority specific to the conclusion established, the extent to which it is homologated – directly depends on the validity and power of the argumentation or demonstration. From this perspective, we can explain the social consolidation of the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann E, 2001) as a macro social failure of ceremonial discoursiveness (Suciu, L. 2019, Kačerauskas et al. 2020). (Zhukova, et al., 2022). The spiral is a refraction in front of the conventionally accepted evidence. We define evidence as the reality that promotes itself by itself. They do not need any kind of support or help. This is the reason why the first option in any discourse is represented by the complex innocence of the evidential (González et al., 2017, Marín-Arrese, J. I. 2021)The discourse of the evidential

does not need any kind of evidence in order to make the transition to the evidence. Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca state, "We are firmly convinced that the most solid convictions are those that do not need any kind of evidence to be accepted. Moreover, most of the time, they are not explained" (Perelman C& Olbtrechts-Tyteca L., 1958). This is the truth: our most important opinions, our existential-gnoseological axioms, are evidential.

The evidential discourse is a construction structured on the evidence, a non-argumentative construction. This is based on the centrality of evidentiality, and it flows lingually similar to an impartation, a communion. The communion, the confession, sharing one's feelings, and the Eucharist (housel) have nothing inconspicuous: everything is readily noticeable. They represent discursive constructions that can stand for the evidence necessary to tear apart. A. Marga's unfounded idea, namely that "any construction contains a tacit argumentation" (Marga A., 1991). The truth is different. Our cogitative practice is mainly non-argumentative.

We communicate in order to have an experience organized axiologically. We communicate when we intend to align with someone on certain values, whose meanings will be harmonized by acting at the linguistic level. The principle of common reasoning lies at the basis of the ceremonial discourse. Reason finds the linguistic path towards the evident part of the thing under discussion, and it does not refrain from taking the road. By its dearing demarche, the discourse can avoid or integrate the vague, the indeterminate, the ambiguous, the undecided, the indiscernible, and the unintelligible. (Smarandache, F. 2015, Smarandache et al. M. 2015). All these stand for real perils for good functioning under the circumstances of a minimum communicational effort. The ceremonial occupies what E. Levinas calls "the space of the evidence" (Levinas E, 1999).

The ceremonial is the center of evidentiality. It finds perfection in itself. The ceremonial represents the discourse on things explained by means of the force specific to their natural evidence. It does not need any kind of proof and evidence for the imposition. The most important cogitative quality of the ceremonial discourse is the evidence. Among the linguistic qualities, the most important one is the paraphrase. The field of the ceremonial adjoins the field of rationality, the field of the demonstrative in the larger sense, and more precisely, the one that comprehends demonstration in the strict sense and the argumentation, practices that must come with arguments in order to shape the evidence. In the field of evidence, the fact prevails, or as J.-B. Grize states, "the best argument" (Grize J-B., 1990).

The ceremonial discourse is based on the conviction that everything it deals with is incontestable and inexorable, pertaining to the evidence. This form of discourse emphasizes the evidential. Evidentiality is central. The researchers have directed their attention on the evidentiality (*evidentiality*, *évidentialité*) Chafe (W, Nichols J,1986). and especially on its lingusitic signs only later.

The researchers distinguish three different sources of evidentiality: *perception, borrowing* and *inference*. These can be marked lexically (to see, to understand, to seem, to learn, etc.;) or grammatically (for example, the use of the conditional: *The President could have said that*). Perception is motivated evidentially as a non-contentious ascertainment. What we see with our own eyes is "visible." The borrowing represents the mark of the evidential. These have no obligation towards the criterion of logic that formally constraints any manifestation of the language. However, the inference issue is to be found in the field of evidentiality. Although it is hardly tenable, it is perfectly tenable. P. Botezatu admitted that: "logics is the theory of knowledge derivation or the theory of valid inference"(Botezatu P., 1995); inference is subjected to a logical analysis. This is the reason why, in order to keep it as a proposal, as a protasis of the ceremonial-evidential discourse, the producer must mark it with a reversed energy, extra logical, that is to protect it against any kind of interpretation. In order to achieve that, he has at his disposal only the attitude of incontestability that he emotionally induces to the demarche.

The evidence that deals with the defining nucleus of the ceremonial discourse, is defined, as E. Levinas stated as a "pure experience of the present, without a condition or a past" (Levinas E.,1999). In the ceremonial discourse, communication represents the sharing of a fundamental experience. Consequently, the stricter the immediate inference generated within the coherent organization of significations, the less insured it is against the suspicion of being oriented outside the issue under discussion, against the suspicion of seduction. A ceremonial discourse only subjects to the thing, whereas an argumentative one will also be subjected to the addressee's consent. In the sphere of the argumentative, consent stands for something existential: a constitutive condition. The argumentative way of imposition has two requirements: the work test and the obligation to express agreement.

## 2 Materials and Methods

This paper examines how the principles of neutrosophy can be applied to the sphere of verbal communication and discourse analysis. In order to explain as clearly as possible the concepts researched, we have carried out a thorough analysis of the relevant literature, including works by F. Smarandache. The first data collected consists of works that analyze various forms of discourse, such as ceremonial discourse, imposing discourse, argumentation, and demonstration. We chose meta-analysis to provide an overview of existing concepts and

synthesize and evaluate previous research on neutrosophy, weak and strong thinking, and their relevance to discourse analysis. The research also involves a detailed comparative analysis to differentiate between two distinct types of discourse identified in the study: ceremonial and imposive. We chose this analytical method to comprehensively examine these discourse types' defining characteristics, structural elements, and components. In addition, we used inductive reasoning to analyze the collected textual data and identify emergent patterns, recurring themes, and adjacent relationships. We chose this inductive approach because it facilitates the categorization of discourse elements according to their association with weak or strong thought paradigms and their corresponding neutrosophic coefficients. The results of the data analysis are interpreted in detail within the broader context of neutrosophy and discourse typology. This interpretation aims to reveal deep insights into the application of neutrosophy in verbal communication and its intrinsic connections to various modes of thought. By combining meta-analysis, comparative analysis, and inductive techniques, the research provides a comprehensive and detailed exploration of the topic, contributing to a deeper understanding of its complex dimensions.

The present work has limitations considering subjectivity in discourse analysis. In addition, there may be limitations of a bibliographical nature, which may influence the degree of generalizability of the results.

## 3 Results

3.1 The logic of ceremonial-oracular (prophetic) discourse

Is the ceremonial discourse logical or not? It is characterized by intuition and naturalness that derive from moral honesty and correctness, meaning coherence and cohesion. The ceremonial, similar to the argumentative, is logical. The inferentiality according to which the ceremonial discourse functions acts as a non-compelling implication. It draws the presence of the coherent (the consistent) from the existence of the antecedent. In the field of the demonstrative, knowledge derivation within the inference is achieved by means of the logical implication. The notion of implication is present between two sentences when one necessarily results from the other, (in this case, the first cannot be true and the second false). A. Blumberg defines formal logic as the science of implication (Blumberg, A., 1967). In the field of logic, we have to do with a formal inference. Natural inference, used in the ceremonial and the argumentative, is not obliged to the formal implication: it can make the transition from one kind of knowledge to another without basing itself on the strict implication. It "transforms without credit" (Jayez J., 1988).

*The natural light* makes noticeable visible the evident reality it brings out in bold relief what is evident, clear, conspicuous. Consequently, the ceremonial discourse has no internal need for motivation or any external obligation related to its legitimation or justification. It is beyond any deliberate task. There where we do not deliberate, there is no argumentation or any specialized form of argumentation. This *blamable* discourse is totally non-argumentative. Whatever the capital norm of the polytropic adaptation to the addressee, it focuses on the power of evidence, linguistically associated with the constructive flow of thinking. No discourse can avoid thinking

and language. Consequently, in the field of the *ceremonial*, thinking establishes itself within the perimeter of the obvious reality, by means of language. A product of absolutely natural thinking, the ceremonial is the discourse of knowledge, a discourse that does not deal with issues of knowledge. "Natural thinking," as E. Husserl shows, is *indifferent both in life and science to the difficulties generated by the possibilities of knowledge*; philosophical thinking is"determined by means of its position towards the issues of knowledge"(Husserl E.,1993). What Kant calls *natural* or *popular logic* also lies on natural thinking. In Kant's opinion, logic cannot be a product of the common intellect, as the common intellect represents the ability to perceive the rules of knowledge in concreto, whereas logic should be a science of the rules of thinking in abstracto. Nevertheless, Kant (1974) concludes that "the general-human intellect" (natural thinking) can be admitted as an object of logic if we make abstraction of the particular rules of speculative reasoning and if we distinguish it from the logic of the speculative intellect (Kant I., 1974). The perfection of the ceremonial discourse lies in the need manifested by the logic in abstracto to surpass itself, in order to turn into a logic in concreto. G. Vattimo calls natural thinking *weak thinking* (Vattimo G.,&Rovatti P-A.,1998).

The foundation of a theory of demonstration and a theory of argumentation (as logic of the values and the plausible) is necessary in order to avoid giving ourselves over to mysticism, irrationalism, or ultra-rationalism, once we have abandoned the field of evidence. Thinking can put things into shape in fields beyond the borders of evidence, and seen from this point of view, both the argumentative and the demonstrative expand the control of reason over an area of non-evidence, over a dark, opaque area.

The evidence specific to the ceremonial discourse represents the access to the truthfulness of things. A demonstration (in the broad sense) cannot guarantee the existence of authentic knowledge unless the real order, specific to the things that we must become familiar with, is specified. Consequently, the real success induced by the cogitative-analytical apparatus is not the one that implies the exact demonstration of a thesis but the one that consists in the perception of the real order that characterizes the reference of the cognitive act. This ideal has a

purely referential character, as it does not lay much emphasis on the demonstrative foundation but on the reference on its effective description. To deduce is not, in this sense, a way of discovering the truthfulness of things. We discover things only by their direct appearance, by the representation of their authentic order. Any depreciation of the evidential aspect will surely lead to the depreciation of self-conviction and of its conceptual-linguistic instruments: at the core of the ceremonial ideal, there lie the particularities of the concrete, psychological self-persuasion and its iconic means, as this ideal is based on *direct* knowledge, (on a concrete representation) of the thing, and not on direct, mediated, abstract inferences. The syllogism is the model of immediate inference. Sometimes, the delay in the ceremonial takes place because of the incapacity to demonstrate the truthfulness of things. This is due to the fact that, as Tarski explains, not everything that is true is also formally demonstrable (not even the *truthfulness* of things, we would say). However, Tarski goes on demonstration is still the unique method used to state the truth of utterances *(*Iliescu A-P., 1989).

The cogitative-analytical apparatus makes solid the features common to science and argumentative philosophy: a certain ideal of cognitive rationality, a preoccupation with self-justification, and a model of conviction and persuasion based on argumentation. The preoccupation with self-justification arises from the ideal just mentioned and involves the false principle, according to which it is only the justified knowledge that can stand for the proper rational knowledge.

The ceremonial discourse is structured, similar to the argumentation, in a natural logic, a "logic of the ordinary life," as P. Botezatu calls it. The implicit invocation of the evidence stands for the proof. Most of the discursive productions, no matter whether they are scientific or socio-human, are part of the ceremonial. A small part of the discourses deals with argumentations and demonstrations. The field of the ceremonial discourse includes large spheres of psychology, history, linguistics, philosophy, and other sciences. Here is what Wittgenstein writes in relation to the equivalence between anguish and repetition at Freud: "This is precisely what Freud has actually underlined. In Freud's opinion, anxiety is always a repetition of anxiety that we have experienced at our birth. He does not establish this thing by the recourse to proofs – as that would be impossible" (Wittgenstein L., 1993). Freud promotes an important thesis in psychoanalysis without testing it first; he focuses on a kind of evidence that neither Wittgenstein (1991) considers to be illegitimate. Consequently, science is sometimes oracular, ceremonious, formal, and non-argumentative, it only puts things in shape. This thing is accepted, integrated at the level of the prophrasis by those that expand the space of evidence. The adhesion is based in such cases on hermeneutic comprehension, on empathy, and congeniality, more exactly on a strong intuition, although hard or impossible to motivate, on the concordance between the ensemble of the personal experience and the organised forms inserted within the discourse. The idea is also admitted in the field of philosophy: "The philosophical discourse – as A.-P. Iliescu shows - can take in its turn the shape of a non-motivated construction." *(*Iliescu A-P., 1989). The philosophical discourse does not only *give a particular form or shape to something* but, guided by the notion of originality, it makes excessive use of oracular, protocolary, ceremonious constructions. If reflection is supervised by means of a somehow non-motivated objectivity, what could we say about our ordinary discourse, totally insignificant and perishable? Each language intervention is accompanied by a ceremonial-oracular discourse, more or less evident. We could say that the natural use of language is the ceremonial-oracular discourse. Starting from this level, both argumentation and demonstration appear as impositive situations admitted out of an epistemic obligation rather than of the need to demonstrate, to prove. The ceremonial discourse is the product of "weak thinking" where it is the natural logic that functions. Oppositional and prototypical, the impositive discourse is shaped by powerful thinking structured in formal logic.

### 3.2 Canonicals within the impositive

**1.** The ceremonial generates a form of negation, of resistance manifested by the addressee, which asks for the notion of imposition. The ceremonial-organizing philosophy represents a type of knowledge that deals with the third person, monological. The demonstrative absolutizes the values sought after by the argumentative demarche, especially the cognitive legitimacy, within the impositive section. There is no knowledge in the absence of an absolute legitimacy; as the only way to reach such a total legitimacy or validity is by means of a strict, formal demonstration, the ideal in question advances the normative limitative equation *to know = to demonstrate*. Consequently, everything must be an incontestable demonstration. By this implicit, if not explicit, obligation, the inferentiality of the demarche is idealized and perceived as mandatory prescription. Of course, other characteristics of such a demarche (approach) can also be found within the demonstrative ideal in an exacerbated form. The demonstrative means reducing the psychological persuasion to zero and maximizing logical conviction. It also involves the transformation of the whole knowledge into a linguistic discourse, in a succession of disambiguated signs, susceptible of a standardized, controllable use that can serve in optimal conditions the exact inferences that will represent the *real* knowledge (Blumberg, A., 1967).

This is the reason why argumentation and demonstration contain both specific and common clear objects of knowledge. Analyzed from the perspective of demonstration, argumentation is incomplete or failed. Absolutizing the demonstration, we devaluate the argumentation. On the other hand, from the point of view of the argumentation, demonstration represents a restrictive and limitative argumentation that does not follow the continuity and the ampleness of reality, that omits the fact that science does not exhaust knowledge, such as knowledge in its turn cannot deal with the entire reality. Absolutizing the argumentation, we disvalue demonstration. Objectivity and equilibrium, in this case, stand for identity differentiation and qualification in relation to the specific finalities and the domains of action.

Beyond their common impositive ideal, both argumentation and demonstration individualize themselves. They develop separately, according to different methods, starting from different points, using different materials, but everything is within the limits of the two generating apparatuses. Each focuses on the evidence, within the perimeters of certain investigative, discriminative programs. The argumentative reaches the evidence by the means of the versatile way of the endoxis, the heuristics, and the agreement. The demonstrative describes evidence from the perspective of the truth and the algorithm. The impositive, argumentative discourse is inferentially a heuristics of efficiency. In its horizon, inference is easy to deal with, the only mandatory condition being represented by the so-called topoi, singular topos, a convention or motif, especially in a literary work; a rhetorical convention). Demonstration stands for an algorithm of truth. Inference acts as a strictly formal implication, according to logical principles, whose infringement leads to the collapse of the entire edifice. Sometimes, a failed demonstration can turn into an admirable argumentation. Both argumentation and demonstration are operational-constructive technologies meant to authorize, justify, motivate, establish or legitimize certain thesis, ideas, and lemes.

On the other hand, as forms of manifestation of discursive thinking, argumentation and demonstration follow different shaping-identity models. The first is specifically structured according to an exigent efficiency in relation to a pragmatic criterion; the second, on the other hand, is structured according to a formal-logical exigency of veridicity. They are both characterized as an internal obligation by the thematization of validity, especially for the establishment of some identitary and self-validating norms. They are thus included reflexively in the discourse: the domain of application, the direction of *orientation,* the horizon of vection, the use of a language adapted to the structure of finalities, the run of the inferences, the demands concerned with the organization and structuring of necessity, the configuration procedures, the relations between the premises and conclusions, the potential mark of the discourse situation.

The impositive is made up of the demonstrative and the argumentative. The intention of the impositive discourse is to act in favor or to the detriment of a cognitive product, to justify a conclusion, to confirm or invalidate the validity of knowledge or to establish what is true or what is false with respect to an issue. In this case, the aim is not constructive or descriptive but justificative. The essence of the intellectual effort is analytical, critical, and evaluative; it focuses on the comparison, confrontation, inference and extraction of an appreciation concerning the legitimacy of an epistemic order. Specific to this type of effort is the fact that it can only develop discursively on the basis of the linguistic (linguistic-conceptual) systems, where we render a *plea* or an epistemic option. The result of this type of demarche is the validation or invalidation of a cognitive construction, the increase or decrease in the theoretical confidence in its validity, the confirmation, the demonstration, the verifcation of its truth. The cognitive performance obtained by the impositive demarche consists in establishing an epistemic order, eliminating the possible cognitive alternatives, or modifying the accepted information, providing the omologation, the modification of their statute of legitimacy. It benefits from varied *demonstrative* means, (in the large sense): non-formal arguments, objections, critical analyses, comparisons, assumptions, confrontation of ideas, mental experiments, various inferences or explicit formal deductions, analogies, inductions, transductions, abductions, syllogisms, enthymemes, etc.

Demonstration is a deduction that is based on acknowledged premises or admitted as being true, whose aim is confirmation of the truth specific to its conclusion. It is thus described as a logical procedure of deductive establishment of the truth of an utterance. The word's origin is Latin. *Demonstratio* does not stand only for *to demonstrate*, *to render,* but also *to accomplish, to achieve* in the sense of formal finishing. Etymology also suggests the idea of *completeness*, which springs from the fact that both premises are rendered and certain in the case of a syllogism.

Aristotle conceived demonstration as "scientific reasoning," explaining it as that kind of knowledge that results from real, immediate premises, better known than the conclusion whose causes they are. "Any demonstration is a syllogism," but not any syllogism is a demonstration, Aristotle explained in the "Analytical Second." He also mentioned that "we can only demonstrate what actually exists" (Metaphysics, VII, 15, 1039 B). The demonstration focuses on the form. The analysis of the thing under discussion is achieved by "taking into account the form and

making abstraction of the content." (Church A., 1966) Consequently, a necessarily true and gnoseologically evident conclusion is formally demanded, by means of deductive reasoning. In Aristotle's system, "not any knowledge is a demonstration" (Analytical second, I, 3, 72b), demonstration involves the use of the syllogistic method or of the use of the obvious material evidence, whereas the argumentation deals with the use of "the dialectical method" ("by means of which we can come with arguments for any issue under investigation, (starting from the probable sentences) and avoid contradictions (The Topics, I, 1, 100 a).

Demonstration in the narrow sense finds a canonical within the presentation made by G. G. Granger, citing Proclus' Commentary on Euclid's "Elements:" the theorem – or the issue–begins with a statement (protasis) that universally shows what is given and what is searched for. Ektesis specifies the data, designating them by symbols. Diorismos resumes in specific terms what must

be demonstrated within the presentation by means of the symbols established in ektesis. Kataskeue (construction) Proclus adds what the data lacks in order to discover what is searched for. Demonstration (apodeixis) establishes the inferences that arise from the construction. The conclusion (sumperasma) resumes in the same terms protasis' utterance, closing thus the strictly stressed demarche of a synthetic demonstration. The demonstration of a sentence from "Elements" is actually achieved according to a certain ritual that can be compared in poetry to the scheme of a fixed poem. (Granger G-G.,1968) The elements of the demonstration are the thesis that is going to be demonstrated (the issue), the arguments (the essential elements of the demonstration), and the way of reasoning (demonstration technique).

"The complete demonstration" consists, of A. Tarski's view, "in the construction of a chain of sentences that have the following characteristics: the initial members are sentences previously considered to be true; each subsequent member is obtained from the previous members, resorting to a rule of inference; the last member is the sentence that is going to be demonstrated"(Tarski A., 1960). It is characterized by the following features: completness, certainty, objectivity, standardization, and mechanization. The theory of demonstration is a branch of modern logic, whose starting point is to be found in the work of the mathematician David Hilbert. It can be described as the mathematical study of the mathematical demonstrations debated during the decades. Celluci C (1978) Frege, Russell and others have made possible, by the mathematical formalization, the transformation of a demonstration into a mathematical object. When a mathematical domain is properly formalized, the formal demonstration will correspond to the intuitive demonstrations. The formal demonstrations consist of a series of formulae that are themselves built, starting from symbols given by the rules of composition obtained by the deduction rules that are in their turn, made known, starting from from different formulae. Before Hilbert, it has been established that various mathematical fields had apparently adequated formalizations. Hilbert suggested that the mathematical formalizations should become themselves the object of a mathematical study; he suggested for this study the name of "the theory of demonstration" (germ. *Bewistheorie*, engl. *proof theory*) or "metamathematics."

Different logical and mathematical theories have been subsequently formulated as calculations of sequences and as systems of natural deduction. It has been established the possibility to eliminate the ending of the reduction procedure, providing a normal derivation (the theorem of normalization) for a large number of powerful systems. These results have an intrinsic, obvious interest. They involve constructively the coherence of the systems under discussion, as the methods used in order to establish them are often as complex as those that appear within the systems. They have been used both within and outside the field of logic. The questions concerned with these results, as well as the effect of reduction and the length of normal derivations have been given a lot of attention in the last decades.

The first real meaning of the term "argumentation" (lat.: argumentatio) is that of presentation: a presentation of things and a presentation of a certain relation between the subject and the others, such as we say in French the "argument" of a work of theater or as in the old Spanish, "argumento," to designate somebody's clothes. Presentation is a way of formulation, a linguistic operation. To argument is consequently first of all,to attribute certain properties to things and determine, more precisely to indicate the ways of things' existence in different situations. Any utterance expresses something, it designates, mentions something. We cannot consequently talk cogitatively about a certain object without associating it with a characteristic. We cannot reference a concrete situation or an abstract state of things without affecting a certain state of their way of being, a specific statute. The opinion we make on another person "has a certain influence on our behaviour towards the other." (Jacques F., 1976) Each utterance is a way to describe a particular thing and, from this point of view it can be argumentative itself, guiding.

Argumentation is a concept both broader and more limited than demonstration. Thought in objective terms as a space of manifestation and area of implementation, argumentation surpasses demonstration. We often give reasons for an issue, we seldom demonstrate. Thought in subjective terms, as an intellectual commitment of the

one that guides a device of imposition, it has no primary importance anymore. Everybody demonstrates from this perspective. A mediated truth of these reasonings does not exist. We can however consolidate a position based on a sufficient reason. The fact that most of the argumentations are called demonstrations and that some of the demonstrations are actually demonstrations leads us to a sustainable opinion. From the play to the perfect organization, everything is a demonstration: this is a demonstration in the large sense. Its sphere includes the logical-mathematical demonstration (the demonstration the strict sense) and the argumentation. A failed logical-mathematical demonstration remains at the level of argumentation. In Descartes, for example, demonstration is a "method," whereas the argumentation offered by the rhetorics is nothing but a strategy. "As Nidditch shows, we can hardly say, from Euclid to Bourbaki, that there is any kind of demonstration in the logical sense of the word. The number of mathematical books and studies during the last 300 years amounts to one hundred million; the number of valid demonstrations close to reality amounts to ten thousand. Thus, the chances of finding a mathematical publication that includes at least one demonstration are smaller than 1 to 10000; due to the fact that many publications contain many so-called demonstrations, the proportion of the legitimate demonstrations in relation to the whole number offered is very small" (Nidditch P-H., 1957). The relation of overwhelming statistic domination of the argumentation on the logical-mathematical demonstration makes the probability to mistake an argumentation for a demonstration to be very limited. Under these circumstances, to designate as argumentation any discourse that does not fulfil the conditions necessary to be qualified as ceremonial, is shown to us as an almost sure option. V. Florescu notices the fact that the big difference between the logical-dialectical demonstration, relying on brachylogy and evidence, and the rhetorical one, based on macrology and the psychological reconversion of the logical, has made necessary the establishment of a terminological antonymy; the former will be called demonstration and the latter argumentation. Florescu V (1973) There is a "demonstration" that lays emphasis on the rhetoric syllogism, on the common places and demonstrations, that can support the rhetorical demonstration as indisputable authorities. The characteristic of this demonstration is the use of the enthymeme, more exactly of the syllogism, whose terms render "verisimilitudes" and "signs" and that can be shortened by the removal of the main premise. Such a demonstration can be nothing more than a "consideration." Its opposite is the apodictic demonstration, that starts from certain premises. Seen from the perspective of its linguistic apparatus, argumentation is a rhetorical demonstration.

The argumentative efforts have two objectives: the achievement of an intellectual conviction (docere) and the generation of an affective adhesion (delectare and movere). There are monolith-discourses, articulated at the argumentative level, but there are also discourses with a simple argumentative dimension (Eemeren and al., 1993: Eemeren, 2010). As a type of discourse and as secondary feature of other types of discourse, argumentation is the result of the action specific to the linguistic and cogitative-analytical apparatuses.

Consequently, we notice, first of all, within the argumentation, a linguistic device that tries to determine the adhesion to a protasis. The issue (the suggestion, the thesis, or the leme) will be inferred from common principles (topoi), from beliefs admitted by the audience, from various opinions. Each association of the thesis to an inference principle stands for an argument. If an argumentation can contain one single argument, it is most often a system of arguments organized according to an order, an aim, a defined objective and a scale of force. As an inferential device, the argumentation has similarities to demonstration. It distinguishes itself by at least four features: there where the impositive argumentative discourse focuses on the opinion, view, and belief manifested by the other, the demonstration aims at the truth of the thesis; in the impositive argumentative discourse, anybody can be the interlocutor, but demonstration asks for a minimal specialization or knowledge; there where the impositive argumentative discourse relies on no matter what assumption, if it is accepted by the interlocutor, demonstration is based on axiomatic or nomological assertions; there where the axioms are at the basis of the demonstration, the topoi prevail within the impositive argumentative discourse.

The impositive argumentative discourse contains a rational or logical component. The logical element of the argumentation manifests a differentiation towards the formalisms, calculations and the formalization techniques proper to the mathematical logic, but also towards the various strategies of the manipulative persuasion. As linguistic-cogitative technology, the argumentation updates an inferentiality by means of which an addresser tries to impose a certain conclusion to an addressee. To this effect, he presents him an argument, a reasoning meant to determine him to accept the conclusion. The argument-reason consists of an argument and a law of inference. For example, in the case of the argument "go to the restaurant frequently", the conclusion could be that you are a rich man, a drinks consumer, or a bonne viveur. The principle of inference used consists in the fact that he who goes to a place manifests a qualifying dependence in relation to that place. The mentioned principle allows the addressee to become aware of the argumentative inference specific to the argument, as well as of the conclusion drawn on the basis of the argument-reason. Both the argument and the conclusion contain different linguistic and cogitative statutes. The conclusion and the principle of inference are often implicit compared to the argument.

The degree and type of rationality as part of an impositive argumentative discourse depend on advanced reason (the nature of law and argument). The force of an argumentation can be evaluated syntactically, logically and pragmatically: a good argument is a correct argument in the first case and an efficient one in the second case. An argumentative field is defined as the domain where an ensemble of argumentative procedures is accepted. It focuses on the development of a particular practice or science: the argument acquires, in that case, an epistemic value.

The impositive argumentative discourse interrelates constructive and reflexive, informative and persuasive aspects. Thus, the validity of an argumentation is always relative, whereas the argumentative rules should be motivated and explained. The argumentation contains the following elements: a) the subjects, that is the ones that express their opinions, responsible for the content conveyed with direct or indirect addressability; b) the theses, lemes, and hypotheses promoted by means of a discursive format, that can be manipulated by particular, logical schemes, by the observance of correct, coherent thinking; c) the argumentative issue involves the promotion of the subjects' theses – the themes they are going to give reasons for, to motivate – as opinions susceptible of being totally or partially admitted or rejected, an expression of the comprehension of the value assumed; d) the argumentative situation where the translations of meanings, the confrontations, the debates, the establishment of the convergences and divergences take place; e) the principles and rules of construction (topoi); f) the inference engine; g) the conclusions.

## 4 Applications

The main objective of this study is to determine the applications of neutrosophy in the field of verbal communication, particularly in the sphere of discourse. Through meta-analytical, comparative, and inductive techniques, we aimed to shed light on how neutrosophy can influence and shape various forms of discourse.

The analysis revealed the existence of two distinct types of discourse: ceremonial discourse and imposive discourse. The two categories were identified based on their alignment with the weak and strong thought paradigms. The results showed that ceremonial discourse exhibited a high neutrosophic coefficient, while impositional discourse demonstrated a lower one. However, despite coming from different directions of thought, both types of discourse converge toward validating knowledge, especially in determining truth and falsehood within the discourse. Ceremonial discourse, emphasizing weak thinking, often leads to a higher degree of neutrosophic uncertainty. In contrast, impositional discourse, rooted in strong thinking, tends to draw more explicit boundaries between truth and falsehood.

At the same time, demonstration and argumentation serve as valuable discursive aids that are essential in shaping the discursive landscape. Depending on their application and degree of eligibility and imposition, these aids can either reinforce a space for critical opinion and neutrosophic uncertainty or establish a space of silence within the discourse. The choice and use of these aids are intrinsically linked to the type of discourse used.

Given the results obtained, the present paper contributes to the literature and also can contribute as a basis for educational resources.

## 5 Conclusions

From this perspective, isolation stands for the absence of conviction, but also for a sign of Incertitude, in the sense that isolation means questioning, doubt, and intellectual reaction. (Smarandache, F., Gîfu, D., & Teodorescu, M. 2015). evaluated the Incertitude as a sign od creativity, of superiority. In the same logic, neutrality, the refusal of a pro or against personification is the Kantian sign of intelligence. "A space with an item, it means anopinion, another element induces another opinion, another element in turn induces another opinion, and so on. The opinion of each element of the structure must be respected. In this way it builds a neutrosophic social structure. The result is a very large socio-neutrosophic structure that is intended to be filtered, evaluated, and analyzed by scientific algorithms." The neutrosophic discourse is an alternative to isolation, a form of openness. The neutrosophic intellectual behavior and the neutrosophic discourse are a form of achieving the compatibility between democratic ideals with the interrogative and isolationist self-limitations.

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