

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND NATIONAL IDEOLOGY IN RADICALISM PREVENTION: A CASE STUDY FROM INDONESIA

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Abstract

The act of radicalism in the name of religion that occurs on earth gives the impression that it obliges its adherents to commit violence in solving every problem so that it raises the opinion that religion is synonymous with violence. Why has religion turned into a catastrophe of crimes against humanity? In this article, the author tries to answer the question, what factors have turned religion into a crime against humanity? To answer this question, the author will use the thought of Charles Kimball, who identifies five signs that become factors for religion turning into disaster, namely signs when the understanding of religion has deviated so that it will bring disaster. The five signs are claims of absolute truth, blind obedience, building the ideal age, the goal of justifying all means, and calling for "holy war". Besides that, the writer tries to answer the question, how can religion go hand in hand with nationality? To answer the second question, the writer will use the ideas of "*Ulama* and statesmen in Indonesia in instilling national values so that they can eliminate radicalism.

Keywords: *Religion, nationality, and radicalism.*

1. Introduction

The third millennium era became an era of religious awakening, which was accompanied by the increasing dynamics of different interpretations of religious teachings, which resulted in different religious patterns. The dynamics of differences in understanding in religion can occur, both ideologically, ritually, intellectually, actively and in social movements (Pratikno &

Lay, 2017). Besides, this phenomenon of different understanding can give birth to an inclusive understanding also an exclusive understanding (Haryanto et al., 2018). According to Johan Efendi, religion is often double-faced, at one time a face of peace by proclaiming peace, as a guide to safety, unity and brotherhood, but at other times it shows its fierce face and spreads conflict, sometimes even more than that is, as recorded in history, it led to wars that claimed lives (Aftab, 2019). If we return to the teachings of religion itself that the emergence of conflict is caused by religion - instead it raises the question - where will the God we worship and are asked for guidance allows damage, destruction and annihilation?

Is it true that the emergence of conflict that leads to destruction, destruction and destruction is caused by religion? Some researchers, say for example a large socialist figure, namely Karl Mark (Munck, 2021), criticized religion by saying that “religion is the opium of the people”, meaning that religion is what always makes people complacent and raises problems in society (Lela Saputri & Gunaryo, 2021). Clifford Geertz seems to suspect religion as having a conflict function. How come? According to him, one of the functions of religion in human social life is to function as social integration (Conner, 2019). When religion functions as social integration, it can directly lead to a conflict function. This is because conflicts can arise when differences in understanding of religious teachings arise and these differences are reinforced by the unilateral and absolute truth claims of each religion (Parker, 2014).

A.N. Wilson said that religion is a dilemma (Turner, 2020), this is because religion as a belief system will place the belief held by a person must have a building of truth that forms the belief that each individual believes in intolerant of other people, even more and more feel entitled to disbelieve others. From here religion becomes the source of the dilemmas of chaos (Ozturk, 2016).

The exclusive style of religious understanding places oneself as the most self-righteous concept and practice. This is what is currently sweeping the world, including Indonesia. Exclusive religious ideology has become a scourge for the life of the nation and state (Knutson et al., 2021). Why is religion often a trigger for radicalism? Especially in Indonesia.

2. Factors Causing Religion to Become a Source of Radicalism in Indonesia

The birth of a form of violence in the name of religion can occur because of the emergence of a relationship between the two which is marked by ambiguity, namely a very real ambiguity (Du Toit, 2019). There is a saying: religion is like two opposing sides of a coin, meaning that one side of religion is a source of peace; as well as a source of violence and conflict. Religious circles may claim that an orientation to peace is intrinsic to the traditions and teachings of religions, but intrinsically religion has provoked conflict and violence (Ismail, 2019). The roots of theological violence can also be internal and external. For

internal theological roots, called them religious fundamentalists, while the theological roots that were external, according to him, were secular fundamentalists (McAnulla, 2014).

What is interesting to note is Charles Kimball's view of the emergence of violence "masterminded" by religion. According to Charles Kimball (Keown, 2017), there are five situations where religion has the potential to integrate with acts of violence. First, when religion claims religious truth as absolute truth and the only true teaching, what is wrong and what is wrong can be destroyed; Second, religion can give birth to acts of violence when accompanied by blind obedience to religious leaders; Third, religion can also integrate with violence when its people begin to miss their ideal era in the past and are determined to make it happen in the present; Fourth, religion can integrate with violence when certain goals justify any means; Fifth, religion can integrate with violence when holy war has been shouted (Olson, 2020).

If we look closely at the factors put forward by Charles Kimball, it is possible to accumulate the *ta'ashub* factor (excessive fanaticism), although it does not mean to simplify (Sahrul, 2017). In today's world reality, excessive *ta'ashub* attitude has given birth to the deadliest terrorist cells. They become ignorant because of the whispers of religion by their rotten teachings. In a person, the destructive instinct and the *eros* instinct are attached to the life instinct, and most of the battle for two instincts in a person that wins is the *Thanatos* instinct (the destructive instinct), especially in the psychology of the masses which are indeed directed to do damage (Theißen, 2019).

In Indonesia, searching for forms of violence that take place in the realm of religion is very easy, because during the last year there have been various forms of violence, such as a catalog that is able to present a lot of data making it easier to find information on violence in it (Intan, 2019). For example, forms of violence that involve mass organizations in the same religious community. For example, the case of expulsion of Ahmadiyah residents that occurred in NTB. In another incident, a number of masses on behalf of a joint Islamic group protested the Inter-Ethnic and Religious Dialogue in Purwokerto, West Java, May 23, 2006 which was attended by Gus Dur (As'ad, 2009).

Another example of cases involving violence in the same religious sphere is violence aimed at the Liberal Islam network, where the figures will be killed for calling out an appeal not to interpret Islamic doctrine too *harafah* (Fenton, 2016). On June 25, 2005, violence in the name of religion also befell a lecturer at the Muhammadiyah University in Palu, who wrote an Islamic article calling "Religion Failed", was protested by 2000 people calling it the Muslim Community of Palu City, and threatening to mobilize a large and large crowd will solve the problem on their own if the police does not act for 24 hours. The most recent interfaith violence was hate speech attacks by a man named Jozeph Paul Zhang, who offended Muslims by claiming to be the 26th Prophet and insulting one of the pillars of Islam.

Violence that may not be purely caused by religion, but religion as its tool has also filled a painful space in Indonesia's dark history, namely the DI / TII rebellion. The DI / TII incident. A political movement that emerged in the post-independence era that uses religion as its justification in an effort to realize its political ideals. History records DI / TII failed. In the Soeharto era, it appeared again. It's just that some of the radical groups in the Suharto era were products of military or intelligence engineering through Ali Moertopo with his Opsus and Bakin who engineered former DI / TII members. Some of them were recruited and then ordered to carry out various actions such as Komando Jihad in order to discredit Islam. Since the fall of Soeharto, this group has emerged more visible, more militant and vocal. This is further exacerbated by the presence of mass media, especially electronic media such as TV, which provides a lot of coverage of the activities of similar groups (Schiller & Garang, 2002).

Regarding violence resulting from religious understanding should be put forward as an interesting perspective. Religious violence classified into three types. First, internal religious violence. This violence can occur in both divine and *ardbi* religions. This cannot be separated from the role of religious leaders. Religious leaders who try to carry out internal criticism (as an effort to reform or purify) have to deal with groups that want the status quo. From here emerged the tendency of progressive radicalism and orthodox radicalism which led to violent relations as a result of the deadlock in communication. This violence can be said to be purely due to religion. Second, violence in the name of religion arises when religion sees itself in the midst of a wrongdoing society. Hence religion feels it has a moral imperative to fight it, as is the call for "jihad". Often it is due to failure in preaching in the midst of society - instead of inviting faith, what happens is the persecution of missionaries, or even the development of a view of disobedience. Third, violence occurs when religions feel threatened by other religions (Samsuri, 2003).

In history, the emergence of stereotypes of one group against other groups of different religions has usually triggered conflict between religious communities which was followed by attempts to attack each other, kill each other, burn houses of worship and places of value for each religious adherent. In the last few decades, many followers of other religions have given stereotypes to Muslims as being radical, intolerant, and very subjective in seeing the truth of other religions. While Christians are seen as aggressive and ambitious people, with a tendency to dominate all aspects of life and try to spread the message of Jesus, this is devastating religious violence.

From the explanation above, basically what forms violence in the name of religion can emerge from the type of person who is religious or the typology of the exclusive model diversity, this exclusive model is a model the exclusive nature of religious understanding is a threat to the life of a multi-ethnic nation and state like Indonesia. Such a thing is because for the exclusive people they see only their opinion as the most correct one and others are wrong and must be

eliminated if necessary, it must be eradicated by force because for them it is against the teachings of their religion. Models or religious patterns like this are usually puritanical and militant in nature, which ultimately results in friction in understanding religious texts and leads to ethnic-religious conflicts. This phenomenon is in line with Huston Smith's thesis, which states that the existence of ethnic-religious has led people to claim their respective identities and they feel different from one another, thus creating cultural fault lines more and more is happening on the very basic line of contradiction (Saputra, 2016).

Religion, which should provide prosperity and peace to its adherents and oppose all forms of violence, because it is dragged along in the political realm, actually contributes to disaster. This is in line with the apologetic statement, especially from religious circles, that religion essentially only teaches peace and opposes violence; however, it is only humans who then misuse religion for personal or group interests, thus igniting violence. What is clear is that the phenomenon of violence in the name of religion actually occurs in our lives.

3. The Relationship between Religion and Nationality in Indonesia

Historically-factually, the founding fathers in determining *Pancasila* as the state ideology could not be separated from the role of Islamic scholars. The acceptance of '*Ulama*' is based on the fact that Indonesian citizens are plural in nature (Arifinsyah et al., 2020). Thus, unity in diversity becomes a necessity in order to maintain the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia. Borrowing Edmund Husserl's language (Mansilla Sepúlveda et al., 2019), the acceptance of '*Ulama*' towards *Pancasila* in the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia cannot be separated from the transcendental understanding stage, where the state founding '*Ulama*' have been able to grasp the substance of religious norms after going through a comprehensive understanding from various points of view. Thus, they can provide an ideal and inclusive national and state life system.

Based on the basic values of state life, the scholars gave birth to the *maqasid al-abkam* approach, which emphasizes a view of life that spreads welfare for the universe (*rahmatan lil 'alamin*) (Surah al-Baqarah: 177 and QS 2: 32) (Adinugraha et al., 2020). From this spirit, the purpose of the State in Islamic religious norms (*maqasid asyasyari'ah*) is to protect basic human rights (*alkulliyat al-khamsah*) (Adinugraha, 2020). When the religion of Islam functions to create the welfare of the people (*masalih ar-ra'iyah*), the state becomes a tool to achieve this goal. In this case, the goal and realization through *al-ghayah wa al-was'ail* are used (Adinugraha & Muhtarom, 2021). If the NKRI can become a tool for the purpose of enforcing Islamic religious norms, then this state system must be maintained.

There are three typologies of the relationship between religion and the Muslim State to respond in various ways, including the following (Zuhdi, 2018): First, those who argue that the relationship between religion and the state runs integrally. The domain of religion is also the domain of the state, and vice versa,

so that the relationship between religion and the state does not have a distance and runs into one unit. The figure supporting this movement was al-Maududi. Second, those who argue that the relationship between religion and state runs symbiotically and dynamically-dialectically, not directly, so that the two regions still have distance and control respectively, so that religion and the state go hand in hand. The two of them met to realize their respective interests. Religion needs State institutions to accelerate its development. Meanwhile, State institutions need religion to create a just and sacred State. Some of the world's Muslim figures who belong to this group are Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Muhammad Syahrur, Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Nurcholis Madjid. Third, they claim that religion and State are two different sources and have no relationship at all. The followers of this group separate the relationship between religion and State (politics). Therefore, the group refuses to accept the foundation of state religious beliefs or formally incorporate religious norms into the national legal system (Supriyanto, 2020).

Religion in Indonesia functions as the spirit of the state. In this model, the state does not formally adhere to a particular religion. So, there is no religion that becomes the official state religion. Religious values are the spirit of the administration and administration of the State. The state guarantees the right of citizens to embrace a certain religion and worship based on that religious belief. As a consequence, all Indonesian citizens are free to practice their religion according to their respective beliefs as long as it does not conflict with existing laws.

The existence of religion in Indonesia is implemented in state life and is reflected in the form of official recognition by certain religious institutions within the State. Then, this is also reflected in the adoption of religious values and norms in the national system and in the making of public policies. Suppose that certain religious (Islamic) laws become national laws. Apart from that, the state also recognizes the existence of political parties and mass organizations based on religion (Khadduri, 2018).

The relationship between the state and Islam in Indonesia is still marked by tension and moderation (Khmas, 2019). Colored by tensions due to efforts to force religion to become a state ideology as a form of rejection of the Western ideology that separates religion from state life. In dealing with the West, religion only functions as an individual affair with God, it cannot be included in state institutions to regulate public and social space. The role of religion is marginalized.

It is undeniable that the majority of Muslims in Indonesia take a moderate attitude in viewing the relationship between religion and state. Those who are in the majority do not reject all from the West nor do they make a religious state, therefore democracy can develop and Muslims become moderate (Kasdi, 2019). Thus, the relationship between the state and Islam in Indonesia is not always pursued through the path of tension and violence, but the tension can be

managed through the path of moderation and tolerance (Nashir et al., 2019). Islamic teachings are universal teachings (*rahmatan lil 'alamin*). For this reason, Islam strives for the values of Islamic teachings to benefit the Indonesian people and all mankind (Siswanto, 2020).

4. Religion and National Integration to Prevent Radicalism in Indonesia

The reform era encouraged citizens to express their opinions, aspirations and interests freely and openly, including the expression of ideology which was very limited during the New Order era. However, this freedom of expression has also led to various exaggerated actions that have resulted in conflicts, disputes and violence in society. Religion-based conflicts flourished in various parts of Indonesia. Many studies have reported the number of religious-based violence in Indonesia (Intan, 2019). This violence is mostly perpetrated by radicalism adherents who apply exclusive teachings so as to erode the values of togetherness and tolerance, which are the local wisdom of the Indonesian nation.

The emergence of expressions of freedom in religion has led to various forms of violence that lead to terrorism as a result of radicalism (Bagir et al., 2020). This can damage harmony and peace in the life of the nation and state, and can even threaten the Republic of Indonesia and the diversity of Indonesia. In a pluralistic society, it is not easy to create harmony and peace because each religious group has different aspirations and interests and this can have implications for the emergence of competition. Especially when each group develops a political identity and selfishness in the name of freedom of expression and human rights. Disagreements, disputes and conflicts are things that cannot be avoided in the life of society and nation. However, if the conflict develops into violence, it shows that the people in certain areas in Indonesia are still not civilized. In addition, those who commit violence can be said not to practice the existing religious teachings in Indonesia (Saraswati et al., 2018).

Various conflicts, tensions, and violence based on religion, especially Islam, arise due to various factors. Conflicts based on religion are very vulnerable to causing violence that originates from terror activities that are disturbing the community (Susanto, 2017). After Al-Qaeda, ISIS (Islamic State) is one of the terrorist organizations against Islam which shocked the world with cruel actions. His followers were able to attract attention from various countries around the world because of his cruelty. In Indonesia, the spread of ISIS looks quite massive and widespread because several radical figures with influence have announced joining the movement, such as Abu Bakar Baasyir, Oman Abdurrahman, and Santoso (Tobing & Indradjaja, 2019). In addition, several old radical groups have also expressed their support for ISIS, such as the East Indonesian Mujahidin, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, Jama'ah Islamiyah, the Islamic Sharia Activist Forum, Awhid wal Jihad, Daulah Support Forum, Asybal Tauhid Indonesia, Mimbar Tauhid wal Jihad, KUIB (Bekasi) (Martian Permana & Adam, 2020).

Several potential things that could lead to religion-based violence (Sudjito et al., 2018), including (1) the emergence of radicalism in religion, such as the ideological Jama'ah Ansharut Tauhid and Jama'ah Islamiyyah and the non-ideological Islamic Defenders Front; (2) the emergence of Islamic ideas that are considered heretical, such as Ahmadiyah; (3) the emergence of different religious ideologies that are still recognized by the Muslim world, such as Shi'ah; (4) the emergence of puritan groups that often label other Islamic groups as heretical and bid'ah, such as Salafis; and (5) the emergence of heretical local Islamic sects in the name of Islam, such as Al-Qiyadah Al-Islamiyah founded by Ahmad Mushaddeq and Jama'ah Salamullah founded by Lia Aminuddin or Lia Eden.

Efforts to counteract the notion of intolerance are not absent. One of the verses that often forms the basis of the views of radicals is the verse of the Koran which emphasizes that Jews and Christians are not pleased with Muslims (*wa lantardlo 'ankal Yahuduu wa lan Nashoro hatta tattabi'a millatabum*), and that verse is also used as the basis for not justifying cooperation with the Jews in the political, economic and cultural fields. Gus Dur explained that the meaning of being displeased was not in a sociological sense, but in theological sense, namely Jewish, Christian and Islamic beliefs theologically did not meet, but it did not mean that socially they could not interact, because the Prophet was also mixed with Judaism. Gus Dur's meaning is nothing but to clarify the problem proportionally so that there is harmony between religious communities. In addition, Gus Dur also viewed with a humanitarian approach, and Gus Dur explained and enlightened that religion has a peaceful nature, so things that can disturb peace must be avoided, the same thing in religion needs to be emphasized and also things that are ritual in nature (Shohib, 2020). Religion does not need to be equated. He also added that the problem of belief is between himself and his God, so when there are people who question things that are of belief, Gus Dur does not want to serve (Khasanah, 2020).

Gus Dur reflected moderate values, especially the tendency to choose the method commonly referred to as the middle way approach (Anam, 2019). In a term often used by students, it is called *tawasuth*. The term *tawasuth* is taken from the letter Al-Baqarah: "And in the same way we make you the mediator (*wasatha*) so that you become witnesses for all mankind." (2: 142). The term *wasatha* itself is defined as "synthesis" and is defined as a middle way between two extreme attitudes.

Tawasuth has three elements, namely *tawazun*, which means balance and harmony, *I'tidal*, which means courage, does not deviate to the left or right, and *iqtishad* which means to act as necessary, not excessive (Rohman, 2020). Thus in itself the value of *tawasuth* is very much in accordance with the moderate value which is currently being promoted by the Indonesian government in the face of rampant radicalism. The idea of moderate Islam is very much in line with the character of Islam which always maintains a balance between physical and spiritual needs, between the needs of society and personal needs, and between the

traditions developed by previous generations and the aspirations and needs of the present and future generations (Sholehuddin et al., 2021). This balance and synthesis in Islam states and strengthens the relationship between Muslims.

To counteract the influence of radical ideologies and doctrines, the National Counterterrorism Agency has also provided several strategies that can be applied by all Indonesian citizens, especially youth as the next generation of national integration, namely (1) fostering a spirit of nationalism and love for the country; (2) enriching moderate, open, and tolerant religious insights; (3) strengthening self-confidence by always being vigilant on all matters relating to terrorist provocation, incitement and recruitment activities both in the community and in cyberspace (online); (4) building networks to interact with peace-loving communities to broaden their horizons, both offline and online; (5) join a community that promotes messages of peace and love for the Republic of Indonesia (Paikah, 2019).

Sects that carry the name Islam have the potential to create tension in society, which is likely to lead to conflict and violence based on religion (Hoffman, 2020). Generally, these traditions convey their beliefs and aspirations by blaming, confusing and disbelieving the beliefs that have been held by local residents since the time of their ancestors. Streams in extreme Islam such as *Mu'tazilah*, *jabariyah*, *Syi'ah*, *Qadariyah* and *Khawarij* their beliefs in history are too biased and create tensions and divisions in society. Therefore, many residents were angry and could not accept these accusations.

National integration needs to be nurtured and preserved in the life of the nation and state. In fact, various attempts have been made to strengthen the national insight of Indonesian citizens. The People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) is one of the institutions that has strived to strengthen national integration through the four pillars of nationality, namely *Pancasila*, UUD 1945, NKRI, and diversity (pluralism). Ideological revitalization is one of the strategies undertaken to strengthen nationalism as an effort to erode radicalism in the name of Islam.

The *Pancasila* ideology which is more open as social capital must be able to lead to a rational and modern understanding which is very important to support a pluralistic and religious Indonesian society (Sudjito et al., 2018). Religious values should be able to make a positive contribution to the revitalization of the *Pancasila* ideology (Supriyono & Kusumawati, 2020). This understanding may change into a moderate and tolerant religious attitude, not an absolute and exclusive radical religious attitude. As a result, Indonesian society is dealing with (anti) radicalism through positive legal methods and religious (theological) methods. This is because relying solely on security or legal means is not enough (Udah, 2018). Moreover, for ideological radicals, the perpetrators may feel proud when punished and think of themselves as heroes. Therefore, in addition to security and legal methods, it is also necessary to use theological methods that emphasize the propagation of Islam as a religion of harmony and peace, promote human rights, and spread tolerance.

If there are two opposing positions, Islam will establish truth between them. The difference between syncretism and synthesis is that the former implies an attempt to unite, in a disobedient or dangerous way, opposing elements, whereas the latter leads to a wise fusion of compatible and mutually reinforcing elements. Since ‘truth and goodness only come from Allah’, Muslims must preserve and develop these traits in Islam whether or not it is Islam (Warto, 2018).

It is also not denied that if there are elements that are good outside Islam and do not contradict Islamic law, then these elements are justified to be absorbed as part of the struggle to strengthen and spread Islam. Carefulness in the synthesis process is the most important part in the struggle of Islam to unite all the different and divided mankind so that they can unite as servants of Allah Almighty (Rothman, 2019).

The Indonesian people should be grateful to have the historical face of the spread of moderate Islam, as developed by the *Walisongo*, where thoughts and actions use a middle and moderate approach. *Walisongo*’s ability to absorb pre-Islam cultural institutions and forms into the pursuit of Islamic goals without sacrificing sharia. In this way they can communicate effectively with the local community and facilitate public acceptance of Islam (Kasdi, 2017).

The moderate paradigm developed through the *Walisongo* legends has become the main characteristic of the perceptions of the Indonesian Islamic community (Suparjo, 1970). This attitude of *tawasuth* is the main differentiator from what they see as dry and puritanical Islamic radicals that are applied by radical organizations in Indonesia and the Middle East (such as Thaliban, al-Qaida, ISIS, etc.). Therefore being moderate is an attitude that is willing to accept the presence of others, not extreme, militant and illiberal. *Walisongo*, who has a pithy knowledge until the Prophet Muhammad was very rich in the practice of living a moderate attitude, as exemplified by the Prophet who could live side by side with anyone, including neighbors with Jews, without being hateful and hostile even the Prophet was willing to cooperate in *Mu’amalah* (M. Jamhuri, 2019).

Moderate attitudes give birth to an understanding of inclusive and accommodative attitudes as well as being tolerant towards inter-religious communities. The inclusive attitude of Muslims is directed towards making Muslims an umbrella for all groups in the order of national and global life. Here Muslims must be clever at playing Islam in the midst of politics. According to Nur Cholis Majid, placing Islam solely as a political force will make Islam even more unattractive (Mukaromah, 2020). Meanwhile, Gus Dur has the view that Islam must be presented as a complementary element in the socio-cultural and political formation of this country. Gus Dur also reminded us to consider the local situation in the application of Islamic teachings with the term “Islamic indigenization”. This personalization should apply to aspects of Islamic manifestation and not to the core of faith. With this attitude Islam can accommodate various developments that are running dynamically (Munandar et al., 2020).

The most prominent perception of its relationship with society where Islam is seen as the majority shareholder, therefore there are parties who are based on the power of the majority (the quantity of the *ummah*) and want to mobilize with the strength of a strong Islamic party, Gus Dur responded by looking at the side of the other context. In the context of social relations, according to Gus Dur, Muslims should not demand more just because of their majority position. In social relations, nationality, and statehood, the rights and obligations of Muslims in Indonesia are the same as other people.

To avoid forms of tension and things that lead to forms of radicalism, as Gus Dur and Nur Cholis Majid have always fought for, namely placing Islam as an ethical foundation in socio-political life, is the most appropriate solution. So the perspective of placing religion as an ethical foundation in socio-political life must also be the big agenda of the holders of religious authorities in Indonesia. The substantive norms of Islamic teachings need to be emphasized not in the form of political ideology. Experience with the New Order which was very repressive, with an Islamic approach as an ethical foundation in socio-political life, finally found a common ground that Muslims know *Pancasila* not in a position that is contrary to Islamic teachings (Nurrohman, 2014). On the contrary, Islam can be compatible with *Pancasila*.

Another result of the experience of placing Islam as an ethical value in socio-political life is the birth of Islamic-style political aspirations that can be accommodated, including access to Muslims in the New Order political system, prohibition of the Social Fund Donations with Prizes, imposition of *jilban*, compilation of Islamic law, establishment of Charity Charities, infaq (BAZIS), the Education Law, the establishment of the *Mu'amalah* bank and various cultural accommodations. The thoughts conveyed by such Islamic leaders opened up Islamic-style political aspirations and got a better place.

The thoughts and practices of Muslim leaders who place Islam as the ethics of national and state life, need to be supported by other religious authorities, so that religion becomes the foundation of ethics for the nation and state. Thus, the existence of various religions in Indonesia can be used as an excuse to unite the nation and not as a reason for national disintegration. As a civilized Indonesian society, Indonesian citizens are required to be able to understand and respect all differences and life in religion and nation. When conditions of harmony between citizens have been achieved, religion and *Pancasila* will become very important social assets in national integration under pluralism in Indonesia (Arif, 2020). To make it happen, it requires the understanding of various parties regarding the multiethnic, multi-religious and multicultural conditions that exist in Indonesian society.

5. Conclusion

When religion becomes a source of disaster, as stated by Charles Kimball, it is because it is influenced by five factors, among others: First, when religion

claims religious truth as the absolute truth and the only teaching that is the most true, others are wrong and what is wrong can be destroyed ; Second, the factor of blind obedience to religious leaders; Third, the factor when his people began to miss their ideal times in the past and were determined to realize them in the present; Fourth, the factor when a certain goal justifies any means; Fifth, the religion of the holy war factor has been shouted. The relationship between religion and the State is a complex relationship, in which it is full of various interests and groups. Political modernization is a necessity as an effort to create a modern state that applies a more substantive democratic system. In the context of Indonesia with the *Pancasila* ideology, political modernization that occurs will never lead to a secular state. This is because *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution clearly recognize the existence of religion in the life of the nation which is manifested in the adoption of certain religious institutions. Then, it is also seen the adoption of religious values and norms in the national legal system and public policy as a whole. In this case, the relationship between religion and State is still a cross-relationship, in which the cross between religion and state is not fully integrated or completely separate. In fact, in all aspects of national and state life, religious legitimacy is still very much needed. To strengthen national integration and in minimizing disputes and conflicts in society, especially religious-based conflicts, it is necessary to emphasize the strengthening of ideology in the process of nationalism so that the national insight of Indonesian citizens becomes stronger and not easily eroded by religious ideologies that tend to be radical. Religious leaders can make a positive contribution by providing input to make religion a comprehensive factor that values social diversity rather than a disintegration factor that supports socio-religious exclusivity. Then, political figures in providing good examples and role models in implementing the values of *Pancasila* and the 1945 Constitution in their behavior, both in daily life, in state institutions and political institutions.

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